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[The Gulf War] was the first space war . . . it was the first war of the space age.--General Merrill McPeak
[¶3.] Despite its hyperbole, the preceding statement by General McPeak, then chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, represented the dominant politico-military view of the U.S. performance in the 1991 Gulf War that drove the Iraqi military out of Kuwait.1 The minority view that it was logistics and preparation rather than technology that was responsible for the quick victory was perhaps best expressed at the time by Lawrence Korb: "If you've got enough time, American logistics will always overwhelm you. . . . You would not be writing the same story if the war had come in August or September."2
[¶4.] This pair of quotes beautifully represents the two ideal positions in the longstanding argument about quality versus quantity in military weapons systems, exposing in the process the generational differences that underlie the two positions.3 Korb speaks from the conservative historical tradition, in which wars are won on logistics and organization, on fundamentals and mass, providing both robustness and resilience against the expected surprises of armed conflict. McPeak belongs to the new generation of technicians, whose military thinking is based on the introduction of high technology and computers everywhere possible, in "smart" weapons and smart systems, under computerized command and control, with complete computer-mediated connectivity and integration both horizontally across the battlefield and vertically from the smallest fighting unit to central command.
[¶5.] The defeat of the traditionalists was probably inevitable even in the case of the U.S. Army, long dominated by conservatism and tradition. Military officers, particularly senior ones, have careers that are intertwined with the civilian economy, and, in particular, with those sectors most closely connected with the military. The shift in the civilian economy from mass-production industry to high-tech industry, with its focus on technology and change as the basis for competitiveness and success, caused a marked shift in the balance of power in the military from warriors to technocrats.4
[¶6.] The traditional warriors might nevertheless have won more often in the political struggle if it were not for the persistent social and political denial in U.S. history and politics of the difference between U.S. conduct in warfare and its stated politico-military doctrine. From the Civil War through Vietnam, the United States has always emphasized the quality and performance of the individual, and, by extension, the quality and superiority of his weapons. But when war has come, be it the Civil War, the two world wars, the Korean War, or Vietnam, the United States relied for victory far more on quantity then quality, depending more on its huge industrial base and manpower pool than on technology or training to wear down its opponents.5
[¶7.] The "U.S." side (i.e., the Union) in the Civil War was infamous for pouring men into slaughterhouse battlefields to overwhelm the Confederates by sheer numbers.6 The United States behaved no differently from any of the Western powers in the equally horrible trench battles of the First World War. And victory in the Second World War was clearly based more on logistics and industrial might then on technical innovation.7 Victories in both wars resulted from the ability and willingness of the United States (and its allies) to maximize effectiveness even at the expense of quality, to absorb losses in attrition warfare with a view to wearing the enemy down rather than outfighting him.8
[¶8.] Unable to make use of nuclear weapons, or to fully exploit its slim margin of superiority in radar or other electronics, the U.S. experience in Korea was little different. Only the long and painful experience of fighting a nontraditional conflict in Vietnam was to expose the cost of the traditional American way of war, and lead to increasing pressure to substitute money, equipment, or technical sophistication for the loss of American lives.
[¶9.] The United States was not the first great power to be faced with the dilemma of seeking to preserve hegemonic control in the face of political protest against the costs, nor will be the last.9 During Britain's long reign, it vacillated between exporting the costs (e.g., by using colonial troops) and mobilizing public opinion (e.g., the War of Jenkin's Ear).10 But in the U.S. case, there was already a putative resolution on the table. The long-term investments made by ARPA and other government agencies in computer technology were just beginning to turn into real products,11 and the resulting transformation of American society and industry was already under way. Advanced technology, and, in particular, advanced computer technology, in which Americans held an enormous and unchallenged lead, was to allow the United States to continue to project power overseas without at the same time putting American lives unduly at risk.
[¶10.] As was discussed in chapter 8, the high-technology approach that had thus far been restricted to space programs, satellites, nuclear submarines, advanced aircraft, and other areas where technical superiority was primary began to spill over into more traditional areas of the military. On the ground as in the air, on the sea as under it, the United States was to shift away from a historical dependence on mass production and mass attacks, from a draft army outfitted with weapons of middling quality to an all-volunteer force equipped with the latest and most sophisticated technologies.
[¶11.] The first real test of the newly designed, newly integrated military was to come not on the battlefields of central Europe for which the expenditures had been justified, nor in the jungles of Asia, which remain the most problematic arena for technological warfare, but in the flat sands of the Middle East, on a ground more closely resembling American weapons test ranges than even the most optimistic of the new weaponeers could have hoped for.
[¶13.] When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, they did so at least partially under the delusion that the United States would have neither the will nor the capability to fight the supposedly experienced Iraqi forces in the desert.12 Following the amazing success of the United States and its coalition allies in the hundred-hour ground war in February 1991, neither the will nor the capability of the United States and its coalition allies could be questioned. And neither, apparently, could the decision to modernize and computerize American and NATO military forces.
[¶14.] The verdict in the quality-quantity debate seemed clear.13 Promoters of the high-technology strategy proclaimed that the new weapons systems were the key to victory, that their performance discredited critics of high-technology military postures, and that the war further demonstrated the ability of "smart" weapons and other sophisticated technical systems to fight effectively while minimizing U.S. casualties.14 Building on globally televised images of smart bombs flying down air shafts, Tomahawk missiles cruising the skies of Baghdad looking for their targets, and Patriot missiles rushing skyward in a great plume of fire and smoke to hunt incoming Scuds, promoters of sophisticated military technologies boldly announced that technological innovation was now proven to be the best and most reliable guide to the future of American military forces.15
[¶15.] The official Department of Defense assessment of the Gulf War therefore took a more sober and balanced approach than that of the technology promoters inside and outside the military.16 The war demonstrated dramatically the possibilities of the still-ongoing technological revolution in weapons and warfare. Many of the platforms, weapons, and systems were used in combat for the first time, and most performed superbly. Coordinated air power in particular was used with extraordinary effectiveness. But this technological euphoria overlooked the special conditions under which the war was fought, including not only the availability of a neighboring country as a base and lack of Iraqi opposition during the buildup, but also the desert climate, the clear weather, the political isolation of Iraq, and the lack of any other disturbance abroad to divide our attention and assets.17 The war also exposed serious vulnerabilities in the network of intelligence, logistics, communications, and other infrastructure required to support the sophisticated and complex military technologies.
[¶16.] The high costs of the advanced weapons had been justified as necessary to counter a sudden Soviet attack in Europe, to offset NATO's numerical inferiority and choice of defensive posture. Instead, they were deployed in the Gulf with abundant time and adequate buildup, and launched in a time and place of our own choosing, against an enemy with numerical inferiority and poor morale, in combat that turned out to be of no more than moderate intensity. Moreover, the decline of the Soviet threat allowed the United States to divert resources, manpower, and equipment from all over the world. Weapons and systems that had been developed to fight a high-technology war on the central front in Europe while coping with a second, regional conflict were brought to the Gulf to forge and sustain General Schwartzkopf's buildup in Saudi Arabia.
[¶17.] Despite minimal Iraqi opposition, and six long months to prepare and position forces without significant interference, the logistics chain was stretched to the utmost. By the time the ground war started in February, the United States alone had transported more than 500,000 troops, 3,500 aircraft, 4,200 armored vehicles, and seven million tons of cargo to the Gulf--a buildup that gave Desert Storm more ground and support forces to dispose of than had been available at the peak of the war in Vietnam. The U.S. Air Force deployed to the Gulf almost half of its total available combat force, including more than 90 percent of all aircraft capable of designating targets for precision-guided weapons, two-thirds of its total stock of laser-guided bombs, more than half of its electronic warfare and command-and-control aircraft, and 90 percent of all of its mobile fueling equipment.18 Almost all its airlift capacity was pressed into use on an overtime basis, just to meet the demand for operations-critical items. The U.S. Army moved 60 percent of its total inventory of modern M1 Abrams tanks and M2 and M3 Bradley fighting vehicles to Saudi Arabian bases, along with almost three-quarters of its truck companies (and 100 percent of its heavy trucks), to support only one-quarter of its combat divisions. And although the U.S. Navy deployed almost all of its own combat logistics force, inadequate capacity let to extensive chartering of commercial carriers--over half of which flew a foreign flag.19
[¶18.] It was known even before hostilities began that there would be little capacity to surge production of major weapons or systems--one of the known problems with advanced, high-technology, low-production rate goods, whether military or not. The need for manufactured goods was greatest for secondary parts for maintenance and repair, such as transmissions and engines. But production capacity was marginal even for peacetime attrition rates, which could have had serious consequences had the ground war begun earlier, lasted longer, or been more costly. The estimated surge time was six to nine months minimum, even for such low-technology items as barbed wire.20 By some estimates, there was not even enough ammunition for the Army and Marines to have fought for another week, and no capacity to surge production to make up the shortfall.21
[¶19.] Fortunately for the coalition, the attrition rate during the air war was much lower than expected, and the ground war swift and relatively low cost in equipment as well as personnel losses. Given the other factors, such as Iraqi incapabilities in electronic warfare and poor morale, it is by now generally agreed that neither the air war nor the actual ground fighting provided a real test of U.S. military strength or overall performance.
[¶21.] The ambiguity in the use of the term "high technology" in both military and popular reporting of the war also tended to confuse the issues. It was rarely clear in any instance whether the term was being applied to individual pieces of hardware, integrated technical fighting components, technical infrastructure, or the integration of the force by the web of communication, surveillance, intelligence, and command-and-control required. Equally praised for their performance, for example, were: laser-guided bombs (ordnance); the F-117A stealth aircraft (platform); the Tomahawk cruise missile (weapons system); satellite photography and communications (infrastructure); "AirLand Battle" (doctrine); JSTARS, the experimental Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (combat intelligence); and the actual management of the complex, multinational force (integration).
[¶22.] In the absence of reliable battle damage assessment (BDA), early reporting from the front tended to exaggerate the effectiveness of some of the weapons used.22 The most glaring example was the performance of the Patriot missile. Hardly a week went by without some dramatic footage of a Patriot blazing off into the sky to intercept a Scud heading for our bases in Saudi Arabia, or for Israel. Even before realistic assessments could be made, the performance of the Patriot was being used to justify further expenditures on ballistic missile defenses and other advanced, highly computerized, high-tech "Star Wars" systems. Later assessments were more sober.23 Many reported Patriot intercepts were hits on discarded missile bodies or other parts as the Iraqi-modified Scuds broke up in flight. The warheads were usually not destroyed; they were just very inaccurate. Indeed, many in Israel now believe that more damage was done with Patriot in place than would have occurred without it.24
[¶23.] There was hardly any system that did not experience some operational surprise. F-16s, for example, had problems with their electronic countermeasure pods because their onboard computers were so packed with information that they could not accommodate the programming to update them for new weapons systems.25 When friendly-fire incidents started to occur, an emergency order was put through for special infrared emitting attachments to provide better identification.26 Perhaps more relevant to the future of electronics in warfare, the many laptop and desktop computers shipped out to the Gulf began to collapse under the heat, sand, and strain of operations in the theater--to the point where the United States was seriously considering treating them as disposable items.27 Ruggedized models were eventually shipped out as replacements, but that took time. Even the invulnerability of the F-117 has been called into question: "It is also debatable whether the F-117s emerged unscathed because of superior stealth technology, the effectiveness of allied air defense suppression aircraft, the incompetence of Iraqi air defense operators, or some combination of all three."28
[¶24.] The tactical problems of sending high-tech systems against low-tech armies were prominent in the "traditionalist" position in the quality-quantity debate. The disruption of large, complex, tightly integrated, highly specialized, high-technology militaries can at times be accomplished even with relatively simple weapons. The classic examples come from the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars, in which relatively primitive opponents were able to bring down expensive, highly capable helicopters with small arms and man-carried surface-to-air missiles because low-level attacks were necessary to find the enemy amidst the ground cover.
[¶25.] Small-arms fire and other portable small weapons were still a very real threat to the expensive, high-technology aircraft providing close air support in Iraq. Fighter and helicopter pilots had to be retrained to fly their attack missions at higher altitudes, or to loiter behind sand dunes and "pop up" for attack to avoid anti-aircraft fire; the long-standing assumption in European war-gaming had been a requirement for low-level attack to avoid the presumably more serious threat from Soviet high-altitude air defenses.29 Had there been a real air war more evenly matched in electronic as well as airframe capabilities, even one not involving continual or heavy combat, the struggle for air superiority would not have allowed such free choice of gaining height or loitering whenever desired.
[¶26.] Even without serious enemy challenge, deadly surprises and close calls occurred. Tactical aircraft and tanks working in daylight hours produced an unprecedentedly high rate of casualties from "friendly fire."30 Satellites passing overhead mistakenly identified a flight of B-52 bombers as a barrage of Scud missiles. Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft (AWACS) had to intervene to prevent allied fighters from attacking their own returning bombers.31 And, in the few cases when tanks did become entangled in more traditional battles, close air support often had to be foregone to avoid indiscriminate attacks on friend and foe alike.
[¶27.] The success of military technology is measured by the performance of those systems for which electronics, and in particular computerized electronics, is central to performance as well as missions: intelligence and surveillance; navigation; air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles; and, above all, the ability to create, supply, inform, coordinate, and integrate the forces in the field. Although these capabilities were tested in the Gulf War, the inability of Iraq to interfere or intervene, particularly with electronic countermeasures, made it more of a field exercise than a real combat situation.
[¶28.] But separate assessments of individual weapons or systems are not really to the point. Because modern militaries are increasingly designed to operate in a computer-integrated environment when the level and intensity of conflict is high, an overall assessment of system performance is required. Given the nature and duration of the battle in Iraq, all that has been proven is that the forces we have are very successful given open skies, a preponderance of force, and minimal effective opposition.
[¶29.] Iraq had no meaningful capability at all in the critical area of electronic warfare, enabling coalition forces to move freely while keeping close tabs on Iraqi forces, particularly at night. Furthermore, the conditions of desert warfare--flat and open land free of the dense jungle cover of Vietnam or the mountainous and craggy terrain of Afghanistan--also provided little or no natural interference with surveillance, intelligence, and communications, and no place for Iraq to hide, disperse, or mask their combat forces effectively.
[¶31.] With six months to establish the command-and-control network and accumulate supplies without interference, combat experience provided few surprises. In contrast, the more general lessons about the organization, management, and integration of forces were numerous, and potentially disturbing. The organization behind the weapons did work, but only at tremendous cost, even under uniquely favorable conditions. The United States was able to mobilize, on its own schedule, whatever pieces were required out of a force structure intended to fight one and a half wars simultaneously, and then to use it to fight a half-war under maximally favorable conditions, at the cost of almost totally stripping Europe and the United States of systems, spares, and maintenance.32
[¶32.] Up and down the line of logistics and supply, the United States and its allies had time to train, to tighten up, to identify problems, and to reflect upon the battle terrain in ways that would not otherwise have been possible. There is every reason to question whether the coalition would have been able to act as well, and with such small losses, if it had been denied the time to mobilize and prepare its forces, the logistics to bring them to the battle and keep them resupplied, and the freedom to use its advanced intelligence and communication technologies without hindrance. Although U.S. forces arrived in Saudi Arabia quickly after the first Iraqi move in to Kuwait in August 1990, there was a lengthy period thereafter when the coalition could not have defended its bases or its position from a follow-on Iraqi invasion.33
[¶33.] Considerable resources had to be diverted even in the relatively one-sided conditions. High-technology weapons systems using black boxes operated smoothly, but only at enormous expense, and at the cost of moving almost all of the U.S. reserve repair capacity into sprawling Saudi bases that would have been quite vulnerable to a serious Iraqi attack. As many as eight scarce and expensive electronic warfare aircraft were used to cover a dozen F-16s on a raid; the high ratio of support to combat aircraft was not untypical for air operations, and in some cases was a limiting factor. Satellites intended to cover the Soviet Union and other areas of the world had to be moved into position to provide surveillance and intelligence. Command-and-control resources intended to fight a major, global war were diverted to the Gulf to manage the intricacies of the battle.
[¶34.] The high level of redundancy in resources and ample preparation time made possible by the six-month buildup preceding hostilities were not as apparent to the press, or as widely publicized, as fancy weapons; but they were unquestionably the most important factors in the smoothness and effectiveness of military operations, particularly in the four-day ground war. That time was needed to test, adjust, maintain, and make fully operational a large number of the high-tech platforms and systems. It was also needed to collect data and develop intelligence and information. At the beginning of the buildup there were almost no up-to-date photos of the combat area. In fact, it took almost all of the six months to acquire, analyze, digitize, and program the key terrain and target information needed for programming the Tomahawk cruise missile's guidance computers.34
[¶35.] As materiél and logistical support accumulated in the theater by stripping units in Germany and the United States, maintenance bases in Saudi Arabia had virtually unprecedented access to parts and to diagnostic and other critical skills in a U.S. military establishment designed and sized to fight not one, but two global wars. National guard and other reserve units were mined for resources. Missing personnel for critical slots, always in short supply even in peacetime, were sought out and brought to the theater. Even active duty personnel for whom there was no immediate use were nevertheless alerted and retained.35
[¶36.] Military skills were further augmented by an extraordinary amount of on-site contractor expertise, in the form of special teams of civilian experts who helped diagnose problems and supplied needed parts.36 In many cases, this involved direct communications with or transport to and from the United States. Computerized electronic warfare aboard aircraft, for example, needed to be updated constantly to adjust to changing evaluation of threats. At first, this involved the awkward and time-consuming shuttling of tapes between the U.S. and the Saudi bases. Given the time to adjust, the United States was able to establish direct, secure communications links, allowing the direct updating and reprogramming from the United States of aircraft computer systems located in the Gulf.37 And many of the black box electronic packages aboard tanks and naval vessels as well as aircraft were shuttled back and forth for maintenance, updating, and servicing.
[¶37.] The amount of expert support needed to achieve high levels of availability was never given much prominence in military or press accounts, even though they foreshadow the demands new weapons systems will impose upon even a smaller high-technology military. Many support roles have been transferred to civilian employees or contractors to conserve military manpower; many more are being so designated because the specialized skills are not and will not be available. As the DoD report concludes: "It seems clear that future contingencies also will require the presence and involvement of civilians in active theaters of operations."38 But "active theaters" generally mean within zones of combat. Given that civilians are, after all, civilians, and receive no hazard pay and few awards for being in a combat zone, it is an open question whether maintenance bases will be able to draw as easily on civilian personnel if U.S. forces are required to construct and use their forward bases under the threat of serious enemy attack.
[¶38.] Some of the war's success stories become more problematic when examined in this light. Although such adaptations are normal for battlefield conditions, these conditions eliminate many of the supposed advantages of advanced over-the-horizon and fire-and-forget weapons. Rather than adding flexibility, these advanced systems must be closely constrained in their application by integrated command networks that guarantee that they are allocated efficiently, and that the right targets are being destroyed. The resulting military organization needs relatively predictable conditions to assure that these networks perform successfully, and is less likely to be effective in a disruptive, hard-fought conflict.
[¶39.] This vivid demonstration of the depth and breadth of support necessary to support a large, complex military organization equipped with advanced, complex, and often fragile technologies and machines is perhaps the single greatest lesson of the war in the Gulf, however long it took to sink in. It is not clear if even six months would have been adequate if Iraq had been willing (or able) to actively disrupt organizational growth, training, and integration.
[¶41.] The DoD noted that: "The services put more electronics communications connectivity into the Gulf in 90 days than we put in Europe in 40 years."39 The largest complete C3 I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) system ever assembled was put into place to connect not only the U.S. forces in the Gulf, but to sustain bases in the United States, the national command authority in Washington, and other coalition forces. The achievement was so stunning that the mere existence and reliable functioning of the network was one of the great successes of the war. But later analysis has also shown that the performance of the electronic warfare and command-and-control systems left much to be desired.
[¶42.] Shortfalls in operations caused by lack of equipment hampered many operations, particularly of the more advanced weapons and systems. "The greatest limitation on the U.S. ability to apply combat power . . . was our own lack of systems to support combat aircraft in theater. At any given time we were only able to use 25 percent of the combat air assets we had in theater simply because it took . . . 100 percent of the electronic war assets to support that limited effort."40 Aircraft IFF equipment reliability and maintenance was a constant problem, both at the individual aircraft level and to the airborne war-fighting command posts. This was further exacerbated by the lack of interoperability or standardization among the several coalition air forces. Some analysts even suggested that the United States would be better off investing in more electronic warfare equipment instead of buying more combat aircraft.
[¶43.] The demand for intelligence data, particularly satellite and reconnaissance imagery, for targeting precision-guided munitions, was insatiable, and simply could not be met even by the commitment of as many U.S. resources as could be made available.41 Nor were the services able to organize, process, and coordinate it efficiently. The volume of data simply swamped the tactical intelligence system, and came near to paralyzing other systems for electronic integration and command-and-control.42 And it is likely to continue to do so in the future, no matter what steps are taken, since data-gathering technology tends to stay ahead of data processing capabilities, and perhaps always will.
[¶44.] Maintaining the volume of communications also turned out to be an incredible problem even in the absence of effective Iraqi capabilities for jamming or other counter-communications measures expected in a major combat theater. At the peak, 286 separate communications centers were interacting with each other, and with out-of-theater command centers. A hybrid telephone system made up of several generations of different communications equipment from different services, and from different countries, handled more than 700,000 telephone calls and 150,000 important messages a day. Daily management and monitoring of more than 35,000 frequencies was required to assure that channels were clear and free of interference.43
[¶45.] Communications links included SHF military satellite channels, UHF tactical channels, the military's automatic digital network (AUTODIN) and worldwide military command-and-control system, and even channels made available over more secure defense satellite systems intended for other purposes. Even that was not enough. The Navy's UHF satellite communications links were so overtaxed that at one point in late November, Naval Space Command announced that no more coverage was available. Commercial terminals and leased commercial channels were used to augment the capacity, including INTELSAT and even the Saudi national telephone service. Some commercial equipment was even installed on Navy ships.44 The serious weakness of the resulting system, its vulnerability to both electronic and physical interference, was never exposed because Iraq never put it to the test.
[¶46.] Other command-and-control problems were worked out during the six months of buildup to the point where little friction occurred during the operational ground war phase. This was no small task considering the number of allied as well as U.S. units that had to be integrated into a single, coordinated structure, and the breadth and complexity of the frontal attack that had to be synchronized. Even so, the postwar evaluation was that combined forces command and control is still rudimentary, and might have proved inflexible and unwieldy if there had been any setback or surprises during execution of planned joint maneuvers. As it was, technological improvisation was called into play many times to develop innovations or other workarounds. Once again, the amount of time available to test systems and practice using them proved crucial.
[¶47.] The greatest success of C3 I was in the critical task of integrating and coordinating the air war, both before the ground attack and during it. When data and targeting information were available, mission planning was frequently accomplished in hours, rather than the days that had characterized combat in Vietnam. Also highly praised was the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), a network of satellites whose transmitted data allow accurate determination of the receiver's position to within a few meters. Indeed, some units used comparison of GPS position readings as a method of IFF verification during the ground war. In addition to terrestrial navigation, GPS was also used to improve aircraft navigation accuracy and provide midcourse guidance for cruise missiles.
[¶48.] On the other hand, there was often some confusion and delay in getting ground targets identified and targeted, owing to the long and complex chain of command involved. The shortage of military GPS receivers also forced mass purchases of commercial units, which in turn meant that the United States had to disable the security provisions of GPS that normally deny such accurate positioning to non-security-cleared receivers.45
[¶49.] Fortunately for the coalition, the rapid Iraqi collapse eased the strain as the war went on instead of increasing it. Such rudimentary electronic warefare capabilities as Iraq had were targeted early on and quickly rendered inoperable or unusable, and other, more devious strategies for interfering with the web of coalition communications and information nets were apparently not tried. But at no time did the Gulf War test whether the required electronic infrastructure was really robust or resilient against a systematic, capable, and determined effort to disrupt it at either the tactical or command level.
[¶51.] Military technologies, like civil ones, are subject to the familiar drive of the "product displacement cycle."46 The United States can attempt to maintain dominance by continuing to generate ever more advanced and complex weapons systems, even as the last generation is sold to or co-produced by our allies. If the historical cycle holds, European powers will then buy or co-develop the equivalent of today's high-tech systems, while the United States continues its search for newer, more advanced, and far more expensive ones. In turn, the Europeans will seek to keep their costs down by marketing their technology, or their skills, to the richer of the developing countries. This, at least, would replicate the history of the arms race in the Middle East.
[¶52.] Under such circumstances, the future U.S. force would still be capable of inflicting greater and greater damage, but at ever increasing costs and risks. It could be used with assured success only against opponents who lack the countering technical capabilities. Given the vigor of the arms markets, especially after the Gulf War, the number of such convenient countries will continue to decline. The United States would then be unable credibly to protect its interests, or project force, against less accommodating opponents who are too large or too technically knowledgeable for the intricately integrated U.S. systems to defeat with the required minimal casualties.
[¶53.] Until recently, U.S. armed forces justified their "inefficiently" duplicative resources in terms of slack--unused reserves to be drawn upon and orchestrated when these inevitable disruptions occur. The move to greater efficiency by reducing organizational slack, to cut personnel and compensate with computers and electronic networks, to substitute "just-in-time" resupply for stockpiles, is familiar enough to students of modern industrial policies. But civilian firms that rely on electronic systems, and, in particular, on computerized equipment, for integration, coordination, and control generally do not face the same consequences if systems fail, and are almost never expected to perform under armed attack.
[¶54.] Able to purchase fewer and fewer of the new systems in times of budgetary restraint, the U.S. might increasingly shift to forces shaped primarily for high-tech intervention without a full appreciation for the risks that might be entailed. Claiming to have learned the double lesson of high-technology and low-cost intervention from its success in the Gulf, the military might well move toward a high-technology "surgical" force directed primarily at smaller and less capable powers. But to do so without providing a proportionately larger support system will produce a military that lacks robustness and resilience against errors, against surprises, and against clever, if unsophisticated, countermeasures.
[¶55.] The modern U.S. military is increasingly becoming a complex, highly interconnected, integrated socio-technical system with high interdependence between and among units.47 As such, it requires intensive, timely logistics and information support. The high-technology weapons were effective because their support systems were allowed to train and operate without hindrance, and almost without time or resource constraint. Because the conflict did not test the combat robustness of U.S. forces adequately, there is reason for caution about potential vulnerabilities if the United States is pressured by time or circumstance to deploy against a similar opponent at less than full strength, or against a more powerful opponent even if its full strength can be brought to bear.
[¶56.] The Gulf War victory crystallized the emerging redefinition of military effectiveness through advanced technology as a substitute for American lives discussed at the beginning of this chapter. This emphasis may be more sensible in peacetime than in war. Peacetime militaries are not threatened with a sudden loss of staff as a matter of daily routine. They do not face a malicious enemy trying to physically cause as much trouble as possible to critical communication or information links.
[¶57.] The underlying arguments of the quantity-quality debate concerning robustness, reliability, and the ability to cope with fundamental surprise have not been resolved. What is more, the subsequent political and bureaucratic reinforcement of those who have based their careers and their futures on advanced, computerized military technologies almost certainly guarantees that they will hardly be addressed.
[¶59.] Because of the many special conditions, the coalition's invasion of Iraq bore more resemblance to an elaborate simulation, or perhaps video game, than the hyper-complex, high-attrition, electronic scramble that is usually envisioned when analysts talk about the coming technological transition in warfare. This goes beyond the question of what success the United States would have had if the Iraqis had fought back effectively. Given the positions, the isolation of Iraq, and the military asymmetries, the coalition would have won regardless. But the costs might have been far, far higher.
[¶60.] The most lasting lessons of the Gulf War were the indirect ones learned by the troops in their day-to-day operations; the real transition that is taking place is more a transition in the perception of combat than in the nature and structure of warfare. In the future, survival in combat may come to depend almost entirely on getting off the first accurate shot.
[¶61.] Even without a major war, the battlefield environment has been transformed by technical innovation in the past fifty years. It is a long way from the desperate and closely fought tank meleés of the Ukraine or North Africa to an M1A1 commander blowing up Iraqi tanks with precise single shots while moving across rough terrain. Fighter pilots operating under the control of AWACS with an umbrella of electronic warfare support, firing missiles at signals seen only on their radar, are even farther technically from the Battle of Britain. And the pilot of an F-117, flying to Baghdad in a cloak of stealth with television-guided precision weapons, may not even have been born when James Michener immortalized the dangers of flying into the teeth of air defenses in Korea to attack the bridges at Toko-ri.48
[¶62.] When the rain of arrows fell on the French knights at Agincourt, the archers knew that they were no longer fodder to be fed into the periphery of battles between armored nobles, even if the kings and princes were slow to catch up. The U.S. Marines cheering the Gatling guns at San Juan Hill, the British Maxim gunners mowing down rank after rank of Dervishes at Omdurman and Zulus at Mome Gorge, and even the Tibetans, Furani, or Ashanti who simply dropped their weapons and walked away once they realized what was happening, knew that the day of infantry advancing in formation across open ground was over, even if the generals refused to listen.49 At some future date, the single-shot kills of the M1A1 tanks in Iraq may rank with these as a turning point in the understanding by soldiers of the nature and risks of a new battlefield.
[¶63.] Warfare is being transformed by the combination of computerized systems: high-technology weapons; communications; command-and-control. The Gulf War demonstrated clearly how much military analysts believe that it has already transformed military operations.50 Massive attacks, front lines, indeed the whole apparatus of attrition warfare are now claimed to be obsolete. Instead, it is argued, the new mode of war will be "nonlinear"; an assemblage of small units, moving quickly and independently, striking at will and at night, coordinating with each other flexibly as the situation demands.51 This new "maneuver warfare" would seem very postmodern indeed, were it not for the massive requirements for central control and coordination built in to AirLand Battle and the other new force structure designs and doctrines.52
[¶64.] Having overcome what they regarded as the traditionalist school of linear, attrition warfare, the new cadre of senior officers is now trying to lead rather than follow, to promote rather than resist. The smart-weapon, smart-system revolution has penetrated the military establishment from top to bottom, from the grunt on the ground confirming his squad's position with GPS or using satellite communications to call in a precision air or artillery strike to the general or admiral monitoring or being briefed on the progress of the fighting almost in real time. At every level, and in every service, the introduction of weapons based on or incorporating computers and the rapid and elaborate communications and data processing they make possible has transformed not only the nature and definition of combat, but the linkage among and between commanders and soldiers, the front line of battle and the zones behind it where the smart weapons are mustered, launched, and directed.
[¶65.] It is this complex web of interactions and relationships and the degree of control they make possible that makes the new weapons systems usable and effective. It is force structure and doctrine that determines their role. Yet, arguments about the modernization of military forces almost always focus on the cost and performance of the weapons, neglecting both the costs and the vulnerabilities of the increasingly complex organization needed to support them. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that small numbers of new systems with greater individual capabilities should replace larger numbers of older, "dumber" ones, reinforcing and building on the judgments and evaluations of the personnel who use them.
[¶66.] But wars are won in the large, not in the small; cost-effectiveness is properly measured in terms of the goals of war and not the protection of individual lives. What is not generally realized is how the cost and scarcity of the new systems lock them into networks of mutual dependency, reducing unit autonomy by forcing integration into large-scale tactics and doctrines. Units now fight more effectively, but far less independently. These tendencies were most apparent in the coordination of air power; however, the tendencies were already apparent in other, more traditional areas such as artillery coordination and tank movements.
[¶67.] Unwilling, and perhaps unable, to fight another high-loss war of attrition, the United States and other NATO powers claim that the new high-technology weapons increase both the power and the autonomy of smaller units. But as is discussed in the following chapter, the future battlefield is being designed as an electronic "battlespace," and the need to maintain tightly integrated command-and-control will overwhelm the presumptive discretion given to individual soldiers or units with supposedly smart weapons, even if those weapons are independently targetable and programmable.
NOTES:
1 Covault, "Desert Storm Reinforces Military Space Directions." The epigraph to this chapter is a direct quote made while General McPeak was still Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.
2 Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Logistics, and Reserve Affairs from 1981 to 1985, as quoted by Morrison, "Logistic War's Long, Long Lines."
3 The fundamental question of the quantity-quality debate was whether the United States should spend, for example, a $400 million procurement budget by buying ten advanced fighter aircraft at $40 million each or forty at $10 million each. The "quantity" side emphasized survival of the force in the face of possible surprises or unexpected vulnerabilities; the "quality" side emphasized survival of the individual and the need therefore to maintain an edge over opponents. The substance of the debate is much too long to summarize here. Some useful readings are Rosen, Winning the Next War; Hadley, Straw Giant; Bellin and Chapman, Computers in Battle; Fallows, National Defense; Luttwak, Art of War; Spinney, Defense Facts of Life; Clark and others, Defense Reform Debate; Binkin, Defense Manpower; Barnaby and Borg, eds., Emerging Technologies and Military Doctrine. What is most interesting is that the recognition by the United States in the 1970s that it had to choose at all was caused not so much by the economic constraints that surfaced in the 1990s as by the exponentially rising cost of state-of-the-art technology in military systems once technology rather than use became the driving force in weapons acquisition.
4 Deitchman, Advance of Technology, 246ff. Also see van Creveld, Technology and War; Luttwak, Art of War; Spinney, Defense Facts of Life; Binkin, Defense Manpower; Chapman, "High-Technology Weapons"; Gansler, Defense Industry.
5 See, for example, the extended discussions in Weigley, American Way of War.
6 Ibid., 128ff.
7 This is the main thrust of American Way of War. There were certainly a number of technical triumphs on the Allied side in the Second World War, many of which, including cryptography and systems analysis as well as nuclear weapons, contributed greatly to the outcome. But few of these affected the actual fighting, particularly on the ground. Only when the tide of war had turned, and there was spare production capacity, was the possibility of seeking new weapons for the individual soldier, sailor, or airman given serious consideration.
8 Many comparative evaluations of Allied and German performance in both World Wars have come to the conclusion that man-for-man and unit-for-unit the German forces fought more effectively--unless they were similarly constrained. See, for example, Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness; Dupuy, Genius for War; Sarkesian, ed., Combat Effectiveness. The Germans, for example, had better and more innovative weapons, and, surprisingly to many, were more practiced in nurturing cohesion in combat, even at the end of the war. The American rhetorical posture of precision shooting and bombing, technical superiority, and troop nurture did not match the reality of mass bombing, sketchy training, and the freezing of many design and training innovations to encourage mass production at maximum volume.
9 See, for example, Kennedy, Great Powers.
10 An excellent summary of Britain's dilemma following the Second World War is given by Barnett in Audit of War.
11 For a concise history of military-funded support of strategic and other forms of computing, see Edwards, Closed World; Bellin and Chapman, Computers in Battle.
12 This section draws heavily on Rochlin and Demchak, Lessons of the Gulf War. Since that time, several other major reviews of the Gulf War have come to similar conclusions. See especially, Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War; Freedman and Karsh, Gulf Conflict; Mazarr, Snider, and Blackwell, Jr., Desert Storm.
13 For a brief review, see Rochlin and Demchak, "The Gulf War: Technological and Organizational Implications."
14 That this was a popular theme may be seen by glancing at "America at War," Newsweek, Spring/Summer 1991.
15 For example, Air Force General Merrill McPeak, as quoted in the Washington Post, March 15, 1991; Morrocco, "Gulf War Boosts Prospects." Even long after the Gulf war, the argument for moving to more reliance on air forces and sophisticated weapons systems as a fundamental element of U.S. military forces for all theaters of war persists. See, for example, "Air Dominance Called Key to U.S. Defense." One of the things that got forgotten in this rush to technology was that those emphasizing quantity had called for less expensive technology, not less altogether; the cruise missile was one of the favored systems.
16 Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War.
17 Mazarr and others, Desert Storm, 4ff. See, also, Freedman and Karsh, Gulf Conflict, who argue that the victory was due more to "traditional" failings on the Iraqi side than to the coalition's technological superiority.
18 Cohen, "Air War in the Persian Gulf."
19 Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War, 416ff.
20 Ibid., 444ff.
21 Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert, 229. Other estimates range up to three or four weeks' supply, arguing that the intensity of the first four days could not have continued. Indeed, it probably could not have: In a situation reminiscent of Patton in France in 1944, the speed of the armored attack during the four days of the ground war far exceeded the ability of the logistics system to supply it. In addition, the ground war was being fought almost twenty-four hours a day; simple exhaustion would soon have forced a slower tempo.
22 The lack of effective BDA was pointed out as one of the critical shortcomings of U.S. technology during the entire period. See, for example, Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War, where it is mentioned in several places as one of the more pressing future needs.
23 Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War."
24 Schmitt, "Israel Plays Down Effectiveness of Patriot Missile."
25 Mazarr and others, Desert Storm, 107. They also cite one reference as having likened the F-16 to a big computer game that needed more disk space.
26 Hughes, "Small Firm Acted Quickly." In only twenty-four days, a small Texas firm produced three thousand infrared beacons for $3.2 million as AFID (Antifratricide Identification Devices). They worked in Kuwait and Iraq primarily because suppression of Iraqi air prevented using the beacons to target coalition forces.
27 "Word Perfect Called to Action."
28 "Let's Clear the Air on Stealth."
29 Lenorovitz, "Air National Guard." As many as fifteen coalition aircraft were lost to small arms or man-carried infrared missiles, including several British Tornados (Newsweek, "America at War," 76-77). Note that these were the mission profiles for which the Tornados were designed.
30 Although friendly fire casualties averaged 5 percent for previous American wars, nine of seventeen British soldiers killed in action in Iraq were victims of by friendly fire. Of the American deaths, 35 of the 146 soldiers killed (25 percent), and 72 of the 467 wounded (15 percent) were friendly fire casualties (Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War, 589ff.). All of the damaging hits on M1A1 tanks turned out to be from friendlies. Despite efforts to seek new identification technologies, the report also states that the combination of longer-range weapons, low-visibility and night fighting, high-kill-probability weapons and ammunition, and the necessity to engage rapidly and (almost) automatically to survive on the modern battlefield will greatly complicate efforts to devise better methods for battlefield identification.
31 Schmitt, "Unforeseen Problems." Friendly fire losses were common even in the Second World War. However, the costs and scarcity of the new technology aircraft, and the amount of time and training their pilots receive, makes them far more valuable assets, on a comparative basis, than individual aircraft of earlier wars--perhaps one might use the analogy of losing a whole flight or wing (which is quite different in terms of effectiveness from losing a number of individual aircraft). The point is that even with the best of modern technology, such incidents still occur. The difference is that in the modern era of very expensive and sophisticated weapons and very highly trained crews, the cost of even a single incident is very high.
32 Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War; Rochlin and Demchak, "Lessons of the Gulf War"; Rochlin and Demchak, "Gulf War"; U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm.
33 Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War, 389.
34 "As You Were?" According to Newsweek, "America at War": "Schwartzkopf had to improvise a credible defense from whatever he could scratch up. At one point he phoned the Navy to ask what Iraqi targets the USS Wisconsin could hit with its sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. The answer came back: zero. The Tomahawks must be programmed with electronic terrain maps to home in on their targets. The CIA and DIA, preoccupied with monitoring the Soviet Union's withdrawal of conventional forces in Eastern Europe, hadn't programmed their satellites to make such maps for Iraq. The maps didn't arrive until the end of August."
35 Rochlin and Demchak, "Gulf War."
36 See, for example, David F. Bond, "Troop and Materiel Deployment Missions"; Bond, "Army Speeds Helicopter Enhancements." "The Army beefed up Apache maintenance at unit and higher levels with personnel from the AH-64 manufacturer, McDonnel Douglas Helicopter Co. Army personnel levels were below those authorized and were insufficient to support a war-time tempo of operations. The AH-64 maintenance training base was geared simply to support the continued fielding of Apache units. AH-64 readiness had been low during much of the aircraft's lifetime in the field, and the Army brought in contractor support rather than take chances in wartime" [Emphasis supplied].
37 Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War, 439.
38 Ibid., App. N, especially at 599-600.
39 Lt. General James S. Cassity, as quoted in Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War, 559.
40 Klass, "Gulf War Highlights Benefits."
41 Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War, especially 337ff.
42 Richelson, "Volume of Data."
43 Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War, 560.
44 Most of the preceding was digested from Persian Gulf War, App. K, "Command, Control, Communications, and Space."
45 The inability of the Iraqis to appreciate the situation they were in is dramatically apparent from the lack of any attempt to exploit the open availability of GPS data, or to interfere with the signals, even though most analysts credit them with the capability in principle.
46 The "product displacement cycle" represents the gradual transfer of technology down the hierarchy of industrialized nations. Because labor costs also decline as one moves down the chain, the country at the top must continue to innovate technologically to maintain its markets. And, because the dominant power almost always also favors a liberal (open) trading system, it cannot otherwise protect itself without incurring serious costs. Thus, the "technological imperative" of product innovation can be seen to be a political-economic as well as socio-technical consequence of the structure of the international system.
47 See, for example, Demchak, Military Organizations; Rochlin, "Informal Organizational Networking"; Rochlin and Demchak, "Gulf War"; Demchak, "Fully Networked Battlespace."
48 Michener, Bridges at Toko-ri.
49 Ellis, Social History of the Machine Gun.
50 Mazarr and others, Desert Storm.
51 Ibid., 97.
52 See, for example, U.S. Department of the Army, Force XXI.